Habeas Petitioner Sentenced to Adult Prison When a Juvenile Denied Relief
Gonzales v. Tafoya, --- F.3d ----, 2008 WL 307971 (10th Cir. Feb. 5, 2008).
Petitioner was a passive, small, 14 year old who had long suffered from, among other things, bipolar disorder, depression, and ADD, when along with an older juvenile, he broke into the house of a couple they thought were not home. When the couple unexpectedly returned, Petitioner shot the man in the chest, and the other boy shot the man in the head to kill him. Petitioner eventually pleaded guilty as a juvenile to second degree murder, burglary, assault and battery. The sentencing court followed the New Mexico dispositional statute which permitted the court to sentence a juvenile who has committed certain serious crimes as an adult if “(1) the child is not amenable to treatment or rehabilitation as a child in available facilities” and (2) “the child is not eligible for commitment to an institution for the developmentally disordered or mentally disabled.” The court found that Petitioner was not amenable, and not eligible, and sentenced him to 22 years in adult prison.
The primary issues in the federal § 2254 addressed (1) the constitutionality of the state sentencing provision, and (2) the validity of Petitioner’s guilty plea.
(1) In New Mexico, juveniles are tried in the Children's Court, and that court has the authority to impose both juvenile and adult sentences depending on the circumstances. There are 3 tiers of juvenile offenders–“serious” are 15 or older charged with first degree murder whose cases are adjudicated in adult court with the full panoply of due process rights. The second tier are “youthful offenders” who are children fourteen years or older who are adjudicated guilty of any one of twelve enumerated violent felonies. They are entitled to be sentenced within the juvenile system unless the prosecution has filed a notice of intent to seek an adult sentence and the court makes the amenability findings referred to above. P fit within this group. The 3d tier are other juveniles–younger or with less serious offense who are presumed to be amenable to treatment.
The court conducted the amenability hearing after Petitioner’s guilty plea and found him not amenable to treatment. On his direct appeal in state court, Petitioner contended that the amenability and eligibility findings constituted “facts that increased the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum, ” contrary to Apprendi. Those facts therefore were required to have been submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The facts supporting the court’s non-amenability determination then, were insufficient. The state supreme court rejected the argument, determining that Apprendi applied to elements of a crime, “a matter fundamentally different than findings regarding amenability to treatment and eligibility for treatment.”
The 10th started its analysis by reiterating the review standard that a Petitioner is entitled to federal habeas relief only if the state court's decision is contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States. It encapsulated Petitioner’s argument as follows: that amenability and commitment findings are analogous to the New Jersey hate crimes statute applied to enhance the defendant's sentence in Apprendi: absent those findings, the maximum sentence that Petitioner could have received was commitment to a juvenile facility until he turned twenty-one. Petitioner claimed that the state hearing violated his right to due process.
Here is where the 10th punts: at the time the New Mexico Supreme Court ruled, the US Supreme Court had issued none of its post-Apprendi sentencing decisions in Booker, Blakely, and Ring, none of which are retroactive. Although the 10th acknowledged that some of Petitioner’s arguments had support in some of the language in Apprendi itself, Apprendi did not actually address juvenile findings, as involved in this case. Because “reasonable minds differed” on application of Apprendi in a juvenile setting (the 10th looked at other courts’ decisions, even when the juvenile systems were unlike that in NM), the NM Supreme Court plausibly and reasonably declined to read Apprendi so broadly. (It appears that 10th would nevertheless find a distinction between amenability determinations in a juvenile setting and factual finding affecting sentencing in an adult setting, in spite of Booker, Blakely and Ring. It appears to have no problem with the constitutional no-man’s land that a juvenile like Petitioner is in–-no jury trial, no proof beyond a reasonable doubt of facts to support a determination of non-amenability to treatment-–that result in a greatly increased sentence). Moreover, the trial court’s use of the clear and convincing standard of proof was correct and it did not matter that no law defined what the standard of proof was.
The Tenth completely ignored Petitioner’s argument that his Apprendi rights were violated by the trial court’s finding–without a defined standard of proof–of facts that resulted not only in a massive sentence increase but also converted admissions of juvenile delinquency to adult felony convictions.
(2) During the period following Petitioner’s arrest, he underwent extensive testing and treatment. During one of his court-ordered in-patient residential juvenile treatment stays, he was raped by an older boy. Throughout this period, and during all discussions of pleas, one of his attorneys had doubts regarding his competency and ability to understand the plea proceedings, prompting further evaluations. A second attorney eventually believed, and an evaluation concluded, that despite deficiencies, he was competent to plead. (This second attorney had prompted the plea by telling Petitioner that he could expect to be sexually abused if went into custody and that he would be released from custody under the plea. These facts did not find their way into the opinion). The court went through a standard plea colloquy and accepted Petitioner’s guilty plea.
The Tenth found no problem with the federal district court denying an evidentiary hearing on whether the plea was knowing, intelligent and voluntary. Affidavits from Petitioner and his mother, from the defense attorney, and psych evaluations from defense and state experts were all part of the record. The 10th dismissed the probativeness of the defense expert opinion that Petitioner was not competent due to his youth and mental condition because it was prepared 5 years after the plea. The conclusion that the plea was voluntary was not contrary to clearly established law (not in the facts is that Petitioner’s responses during the plea colloquy were merely “yes”s to the court’s questions, and never once was he asked to explain in his own words what he understood he was doing).
Petitioner raised two other issues, both treated rather cursorily by the 10th : (1) six instances of ineffective assistance of counsel, largely addressing failures by defense counsel to object to testimony and portions of evaluations which came before the state district court when it reached its non-amenability finding; and (2) insufficient evidence to support the non-amenability finding in the face of expert evidence at the time that Petitioner was amenable to treatment. Read the opinion for discussion of these.
Petitioner was a passive, small, 14 year old who had long suffered from, among other things, bipolar disorder, depression, and ADD, when along with an older juvenile, he broke into the house of a couple they thought were not home. When the couple unexpectedly returned, Petitioner shot the man in the chest, and the other boy shot the man in the head to kill him. Petitioner eventually pleaded guilty as a juvenile to second degree murder, burglary, assault and battery. The sentencing court followed the New Mexico dispositional statute which permitted the court to sentence a juvenile who has committed certain serious crimes as an adult if “(1) the child is not amenable to treatment or rehabilitation as a child in available facilities” and (2) “the child is not eligible for commitment to an institution for the developmentally disordered or mentally disabled.” The court found that Petitioner was not amenable, and not eligible, and sentenced him to 22 years in adult prison.
The primary issues in the federal § 2254 addressed (1) the constitutionality of the state sentencing provision, and (2) the validity of Petitioner’s guilty plea.
(1) In New Mexico, juveniles are tried in the Children's Court, and that court has the authority to impose both juvenile and adult sentences depending on the circumstances. There are 3 tiers of juvenile offenders–“serious” are 15 or older charged with first degree murder whose cases are adjudicated in adult court with the full panoply of due process rights. The second tier are “youthful offenders” who are children fourteen years or older who are adjudicated guilty of any one of twelve enumerated violent felonies. They are entitled to be sentenced within the juvenile system unless the prosecution has filed a notice of intent to seek an adult sentence and the court makes the amenability findings referred to above. P fit within this group. The 3d tier are other juveniles–younger or with less serious offense who are presumed to be amenable to treatment.
The court conducted the amenability hearing after Petitioner’s guilty plea and found him not amenable to treatment. On his direct appeal in state court, Petitioner contended that the amenability and eligibility findings constituted “facts that increased the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum, ” contrary to Apprendi. Those facts therefore were required to have been submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The facts supporting the court’s non-amenability determination then, were insufficient. The state supreme court rejected the argument, determining that Apprendi applied to elements of a crime, “a matter fundamentally different than findings regarding amenability to treatment and eligibility for treatment.”
The 10th started its analysis by reiterating the review standard that a Petitioner is entitled to federal habeas relief only if the state court's decision is contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States. It encapsulated Petitioner’s argument as follows: that amenability and commitment findings are analogous to the New Jersey hate crimes statute applied to enhance the defendant's sentence in Apprendi: absent those findings, the maximum sentence that Petitioner could have received was commitment to a juvenile facility until he turned twenty-one. Petitioner claimed that the state hearing violated his right to due process.
Here is where the 10th punts: at the time the New Mexico Supreme Court ruled, the US Supreme Court had issued none of its post-Apprendi sentencing decisions in Booker, Blakely, and Ring, none of which are retroactive. Although the 10th acknowledged that some of Petitioner’s arguments had support in some of the language in Apprendi itself, Apprendi did not actually address juvenile findings, as involved in this case. Because “reasonable minds differed” on application of Apprendi in a juvenile setting (the 10th looked at other courts’ decisions, even when the juvenile systems were unlike that in NM), the NM Supreme Court plausibly and reasonably declined to read Apprendi so broadly. (It appears that 10th would nevertheless find a distinction between amenability determinations in a juvenile setting and factual finding affecting sentencing in an adult setting, in spite of Booker, Blakely and Ring. It appears to have no problem with the constitutional no-man’s land that a juvenile like Petitioner is in–-no jury trial, no proof beyond a reasonable doubt of facts to support a determination of non-amenability to treatment-–that result in a greatly increased sentence). Moreover, the trial court’s use of the clear and convincing standard of proof was correct and it did not matter that no law defined what the standard of proof was.
The Tenth completely ignored Petitioner’s argument that his Apprendi rights were violated by the trial court’s finding–without a defined standard of proof–of facts that resulted not only in a massive sentence increase but also converted admissions of juvenile delinquency to adult felony convictions.
(2) During the period following Petitioner’s arrest, he underwent extensive testing and treatment. During one of his court-ordered in-patient residential juvenile treatment stays, he was raped by an older boy. Throughout this period, and during all discussions of pleas, one of his attorneys had doubts regarding his competency and ability to understand the plea proceedings, prompting further evaluations. A second attorney eventually believed, and an evaluation concluded, that despite deficiencies, he was competent to plead. (This second attorney had prompted the plea by telling Petitioner that he could expect to be sexually abused if went into custody and that he would be released from custody under the plea. These facts did not find their way into the opinion). The court went through a standard plea colloquy and accepted Petitioner’s guilty plea.
The Tenth found no problem with the federal district court denying an evidentiary hearing on whether the plea was knowing, intelligent and voluntary. Affidavits from Petitioner and his mother, from the defense attorney, and psych evaluations from defense and state experts were all part of the record. The 10th dismissed the probativeness of the defense expert opinion that Petitioner was not competent due to his youth and mental condition because it was prepared 5 years after the plea. The conclusion that the plea was voluntary was not contrary to clearly established law (not in the facts is that Petitioner’s responses during the plea colloquy were merely “yes”s to the court’s questions, and never once was he asked to explain in his own words what he understood he was doing).
Petitioner raised two other issues, both treated rather cursorily by the 10th : (1) six instances of ineffective assistance of counsel, largely addressing failures by defense counsel to object to testimony and portions of evaluations which came before the state district court when it reached its non-amenability finding; and (2) insufficient evidence to support the non-amenability finding in the face of expert evidence at the time that Petitioner was amenable to treatment. Read the opinion for discussion of these.
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