Petitioner, Convicted as a Juvenile in 1981, Still Fighting for Parole
Alexander v. U.S. Parole Commission, --- F.3d ----, 2008 WL 224053 (10th Cir. Jan. 29, 2008).
This may be a one of a kind case, under the old Youth Corrections Act, repealed in 1984, under which the petitioner was sentenced in 1981, as a 16-year-old convicted of 4 counts of first degree murder. The Act provided for rehabilitative and training programs for youthful offenders, to help them reintegrate into society.
Petitioner completed all the programs required of him, and by the late 1980's, was doing so successfully. In 1992, the Warden recommended that he be paroled, but the Parole Commission declined, due to his adjustment problems prior to 1987, the heinous nature of the crime, and his lack of remorse. After interim reconsideration hearings in 1995, 1996, and 1997, the Commission continued denying parole. In 1998, Petitioner filed his third habeas petition challenging the denial of parole, which the district court denied. At a new hearing in 2001, Petitioner fully accepted responsibility for the crime. The Commission again denied parole, continuing the case for another 15 years. On appeal, the National Appeals Board remanded for a new hearing and requested a current psychological evaluation to assess the impact of psychological counseling and therapy on Mr. Alexander's rehabilitation. The psychologist found that Mr. Alexander was not mentally ill and did not experience emotional distress. The Commission again denied parole, concerned that Mr. Alexander's remorse was not sincere.
In the current habeas, the district court found that the Commission had acted arbitrarily and capriciously, and ordered the Commission to develop a pre-release program for Petitioner. The Commission appealed. This was a final order for the Tenth to review, since setting a presumptive release date is a necessary corollary for a release plan.
First, the 10th agreed that the Commission was required to consider conditional release in its evaluation of Petitioner’s risk to the public. Under the statute, the Commission has a great deal of power to control Petitioner’s conditions for 5 years after release, before granting unconditional release, and even then, can deny unconditional release if there is a likelihood of further crimes being committed.
Although the district court was correct in requiring the Commission to consider release conditions, the Commission is entitled to consider that newly calculated factor in conjunction with the seriousness of the offense, and Petitioner's demonstrated rehabilitation. The district court erred, therefore, in requiring the Commission to set a release date before it evaluates conditional release.
The irony of the case is that, now, what seems to be holding back Petitioner's release is the concern that he be able to adjust which, the longer he stays in, becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy.
This may be a one of a kind case, under the old Youth Corrections Act, repealed in 1984, under which the petitioner was sentenced in 1981, as a 16-year-old convicted of 4 counts of first degree murder. The Act provided for rehabilitative and training programs for youthful offenders, to help them reintegrate into society.
Petitioner completed all the programs required of him, and by the late 1980's, was doing so successfully. In 1992, the Warden recommended that he be paroled, but the Parole Commission declined, due to his adjustment problems prior to 1987, the heinous nature of the crime, and his lack of remorse. After interim reconsideration hearings in 1995, 1996, and 1997, the Commission continued denying parole. In 1998, Petitioner filed his third habeas petition challenging the denial of parole, which the district court denied. At a new hearing in 2001, Petitioner fully accepted responsibility for the crime. The Commission again denied parole, continuing the case for another 15 years. On appeal, the National Appeals Board remanded for a new hearing and requested a current psychological evaluation to assess the impact of psychological counseling and therapy on Mr. Alexander's rehabilitation. The psychologist found that Mr. Alexander was not mentally ill and did not experience emotional distress. The Commission again denied parole, concerned that Mr. Alexander's remorse was not sincere.
In the current habeas, the district court found that the Commission had acted arbitrarily and capriciously, and ordered the Commission to develop a pre-release program for Petitioner. The Commission appealed. This was a final order for the Tenth to review, since setting a presumptive release date is a necessary corollary for a release plan.
First, the 10th agreed that the Commission was required to consider conditional release in its evaluation of Petitioner’s risk to the public. Under the statute, the Commission has a great deal of power to control Petitioner’s conditions for 5 years after release, before granting unconditional release, and even then, can deny unconditional release if there is a likelihood of further crimes being committed.
Although the district court was correct in requiring the Commission to consider release conditions, the Commission is entitled to consider that newly calculated factor in conjunction with the seriousness of the offense, and Petitioner's demonstrated rehabilitation. The district court erred, therefore, in requiring the Commission to set a release date before it evaluates conditional release.
The irony of the case is that, now, what seems to be holding back Petitioner's release is the concern that he be able to adjust which, the longer he stays in, becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy.
posted by Anonymous at 9:35 AM
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