Wiretap, Traffic Stop, Sentencing Challenges Rejected in Meth Case
U.S. v. Ramirez, 2007 WL 779260 (3/16/07) - The 10th upholds wiretap. There was probable cause: an unchallenged wiretap revealed conversations between the defendant (Ramirez) and another person discussing drug deals and pen register indicated calls to the defendant by someone during a drug deal. The government proved necessity: it specifically showed how it tried visual and aural surveillance, a confidential source and search warrants and pen registers and it showed trying interrogation or using the grand jury would compromise the safety of witnesses and the investigation. The government proved it minimized: "we review minimization for reasonableness of the efforts, not the perfection of the results."
There was reasonable suspicion to extend a traffic stop where: the defendant's truck was stopped outside a home associated with drug-dealing; the defendant entered the home for an extremely short time; the officer knew of the defendant's participation in drug-trafficking; the defendant and the resident of the home gave different reasons for the defendant's short visit; and the defendant was more nervous than he usually was during his other encounters with the police officers.
Cell phone receipts were inadmissible because they could not be considered adoptive admissions: the receipts in the defendant's (Vasquez) possession were only a week old, the defendant's name was not on the bill; and the defendant was not in possession of the cell phones. But, the admission of the receipts was harmless. Their admission also did not plainly violate the Confrontation Clause because receipts from a private business transaction are not testimonial and the receipts were not plainly unreliable. (It's interesting the 10th engaged in a reliability analysis for nontestimonial evidence because I thought Davis meant nontestimonial evidence was not governed by the Confrontation Clause; I guess I was wrong). Co-conspirator statements are not testimonial and never violate the Confrontation Clause.
The evidence was sufficient against various defendants. With respect to Lopez, although the government did not prove he had control over the apartment where the meth was found, (old bills and car title in his name, and photos could just be "common detritus" left behind after Lopez left), the overheard conversations of jailed co-conspirators urging Lopez to get rid of the meth in the apartment demonstrated his ability to collect and transfer the meth. Lopez's storage unit with drug paraphernalia and his conversations regarding drugs were enough to prove his participation in a drug conspiracy. With respect to Mozqueda-Ramirez, while his references to a "white Camaro" and "a Brave One," may not be enough, his conversations with numerous other coded references to drugs was enough. With respect to Vasquez, a drug ledger referring to him, his drug-coded conversations and references by co-conspirators to him were enough.
Mozqueda-Ramirez failed to prove the existence of a "complete breakdown" in the attorney-client relationship to justify withdrawal of attorney two weeks before complicated trial.
Booker did not affect mandatory minima and did not prohibit judicial fact-finding resulting in a higher advisory guideline range.
There was reasonable suspicion to extend a traffic stop where: the defendant's truck was stopped outside a home associated with drug-dealing; the defendant entered the home for an extremely short time; the officer knew of the defendant's participation in drug-trafficking; the defendant and the resident of the home gave different reasons for the defendant's short visit; and the defendant was more nervous than he usually was during his other encounters with the police officers.
Cell phone receipts were inadmissible because they could not be considered adoptive admissions: the receipts in the defendant's (Vasquez) possession were only a week old, the defendant's name was not on the bill; and the defendant was not in possession of the cell phones. But, the admission of the receipts was harmless. Their admission also did not plainly violate the Confrontation Clause because receipts from a private business transaction are not testimonial and the receipts were not plainly unreliable. (It's interesting the 10th engaged in a reliability analysis for nontestimonial evidence because I thought Davis meant nontestimonial evidence was not governed by the Confrontation Clause; I guess I was wrong). Co-conspirator statements are not testimonial and never violate the Confrontation Clause.
The evidence was sufficient against various defendants. With respect to Lopez, although the government did not prove he had control over the apartment where the meth was found, (old bills and car title in his name, and photos could just be "common detritus" left behind after Lopez left), the overheard conversations of jailed co-conspirators urging Lopez to get rid of the meth in the apartment demonstrated his ability to collect and transfer the meth. Lopez's storage unit with drug paraphernalia and his conversations regarding drugs were enough to prove his participation in a drug conspiracy. With respect to Mozqueda-Ramirez, while his references to a "white Camaro" and "a Brave One," may not be enough, his conversations with numerous other coded references to drugs was enough. With respect to Vasquez, a drug ledger referring to him, his drug-coded conversations and references by co-conspirators to him were enough.
Mozqueda-Ramirez failed to prove the existence of a "complete breakdown" in the attorney-client relationship to justify withdrawal of attorney two weeks before complicated trial.
Booker did not affect mandatory minima and did not prohibit judicial fact-finding resulting in a higher advisory guideline range.
posted by Anonymous at 8:34 AM
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