State Plea Agreement Did Not Stop Related Federal Prosecution in Meth Case
U.S. v. Sells, 2007 WL 614262 (3/1/07) - The state plea agreement of one of the defendants did not preclude the government from pursuing related charges, despite the defendant's belief the DA was communicating with federal authorities. State defense counsel conceded he knew the DA was not authorized to speak for the feds, the government did not sign off on the plea and defense counsel never spoke to the feds.
There was sufficient evidence a defendant conspired with others to manufacture and distribute meth where evidence showed the others helped the defendant to distribute and manufacture meth. A defendant charged with a conspiracy with multiple objectives may be convicted based on proof the defendant conspired to commit any one of the objectives.
A fatal variance from the indictment did not occur when the government introduced evidence of meth in the residence of another person, even though the defendant had nothing to do with that meth. The indictment charged the defendant with manufacturing on an entire piece of property, including that person's residence. That the part of the property the defendant used was smaller than alleged in the indictment did not prejudice the defendant. It was highly unlikely the jury attributed the evidence to the defendant. That evidence was irrelevant because the government never showed the defendant's connection to the residence. But, no reversal for the admission of that evidence due to harmlessness.
The constitutional error in one defendant's case when the d.ct. determined the drug quantity involved in a mandatory guideline system was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The quantity was based on co-conspirators' testimony and corroborating evidence. While the credibility of the testimony was challenged, the jury's verdict indicated the jury believed the co-conspirators. The non-constitutional error was harmless for the defendant whose sentence was above the bottom of the guideline range. The constitutional error was concededly not harmless for the defendant whose sentence was at the bottom of the range. Also, the 10th instructed the d.ct. when it reconsiders the drug quantity attributable to one of the defendants that it consider the scope of the criminal activity the defendant agreed to undertake and the total amount of drugs that was foreseeable to that particular defendant.
There was sufficient evidence a defendant conspired with others to manufacture and distribute meth where evidence showed the others helped the defendant to distribute and manufacture meth. A defendant charged with a conspiracy with multiple objectives may be convicted based on proof the defendant conspired to commit any one of the objectives.
A fatal variance from the indictment did not occur when the government introduced evidence of meth in the residence of another person, even though the defendant had nothing to do with that meth. The indictment charged the defendant with manufacturing on an entire piece of property, including that person's residence. That the part of the property the defendant used was smaller than alleged in the indictment did not prejudice the defendant. It was highly unlikely the jury attributed the evidence to the defendant. That evidence was irrelevant because the government never showed the defendant's connection to the residence. But, no reversal for the admission of that evidence due to harmlessness.
The constitutional error in one defendant's case when the d.ct. determined the drug quantity involved in a mandatory guideline system was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The quantity was based on co-conspirators' testimony and corroborating evidence. While the credibility of the testimony was challenged, the jury's verdict indicated the jury believed the co-conspirators. The non-constitutional error was harmless for the defendant whose sentence was above the bottom of the guideline range. The constitutional error was concededly not harmless for the defendant whose sentence was at the bottom of the range. Also, the 10th instructed the d.ct. when it reconsiders the drug quantity attributable to one of the defendants that it consider the scope of the criminal activity the defendant agreed to undertake and the total amount of drugs that was foreseeable to that particular defendant.
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