United States v. Griffifth

United States v. Griffith, 65 F.4th 1216 (10th Cir. 2023): The panel rules that an officer’s expert testimony about Griffith’s lack of credibility was not plain error. It also finds that a victim’s statement to a sexual assault nurse examiner identifying an individual as the perpetrator is made for the purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and thus an exception to the hearsay rule. At trial Griffith’s defense was based “primarily on [the victim’s] dishonesty.” He argued that she “had frequently manipulated others by making false allegations of sexual abuse.” Id. at 1218. Officers that interrogated Griffith testified that he was dishonest and his comments were either fabricated or inconsistent. Because defense counsel did not object to this testimony, on appeal the panel reviewed Griffith’s challenge to that testimony for plain error. The panel agreed that this type of expert testimony “generally” is not admissible. Id. at 1217. It therefore focused on whether Griffith could establish that the testimony had an effect on a substantial right. This element is shown with proof that but for the error, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different. To assess the probability of a different result, the panel examined for factors: (1) the strength of the parties’ respective cases; (2) whether the improper evidence affected the parties theory of the case; (3) the extent that the parties emphasized the improper opinion testimony; and (4) whether the jurors were able to independently assess the accused’s credibility. Id. at 1218. Here, the panel concluded these factors did not demonstrate a different result was reasonably probable. Griffith’s defense “focused largely on [the victim’s] credibility.” Id. The improper opinion testimony had little, if any affect, on his theory of the case. Additionally, there was evidence corroborating the victim’s version of events. Id. at 1222. Neither side mentioned Griffith’s credibility in closing. The jury independently assessed Griffith’s credibility when it watched the video of the officers’ interrogation. And the jury instructions did not refer to the officers’ expertise. Rather the instructions told the jury to treat their testimony in “the same way as that of any other witness.” Id. at 1223. Regarding the victim’s statement to the nurse in which she identified Griffith as the perpetrator, the panel said it was bound by precedent. The panel in United States v. Edward J., 224 F.3d 1216, 1219-20 (10th Cir. 2000) held that a victim’s statement to a medical provider, identifying the perpetrator, triggers Fed.R.Evid. 803(4)’s hearsay exception. 65 F.4th at 1223. Therefore, the district court correctly allowed the nurse to tell the jury about the victim's comment.