United States v. Leal, No. 21-2003, __F. 4th __, 2022 WL 1028985 (10th Cir. Apr. 25, 2022) (affirming a conviction and sentence for conspiracy to distribute at least 50 grams of meth) Mr. Leal was convicted of conspiracy to distribute at least 50 grams of meth under §§ 841(b)(1)(B) and 846 after putting a confidential informant in touch with a codefendant who then put the informant in touch with yet another codefendant who was actually selling drugs. Leal challenged the conviction and sentence on three grounds: (1) there was insufficient evidence to prove his participation in the conspiracy and his knowledge of the drug type and quantity; (2) the government acted outrageously in its investigation; (3) he received a substantively unreasonable sentence. The court rejected all three arguments. 1. First, Mr. Leal argued that the government failed to prove that he “had knowledge of the essential object of the conspiracy,” and, more specifically, that he knew the drug type and the quantity, because his connection to the sale was so attenuated. The Tenth Circuit held that the evidence was sufficient to convict Mr. Leal, even though he only passed the CI on to other contacts and only spoke explicitly about marijuana, because he “participated twice in a series of calls connecting the informant to the person who ultimately sold the methamphetamine” and there were some allusions to meth and the relevant quantities in one of the conversations. [1] 2. Second, Mr. Leal argued that the government acted outrageously in targeting him because he was a “recently released addict with severe cognitive difficulties” and the government informant was highly paid.[2] The Tenth Circuit held, under plain error review, that there was no outrageous conduct by the government here because there was no evidence that the government engineered the purchase; Mr. Leal could not show that the government knowingly took advantage of his vulnerability; and the amount the CI was paid ($125,000!) was not outrageous, given that he received payments over the course of 7 years and payment was not contingent on results. 3. Finally, Mr. Leal argued that the sentence was substantively unreasonable because it was excessive compared to his codefendants (sentenced to 4 and 5 years after accepting plea agreements, compared to his 30 years) and failed to account for his mental conditions. The court (what a surprise!) rejected these arguments, noting that his sentence was more significant due to his status as a career offender, the fact that his codefendants got downward adjustments for acceptance of responsibility, and the voluntary dismissal of some of the codefendants’ charges. The court also noted that disparity is not measured by comparison to codefendants, but by looking at national averages. The court found that the district court considered Mr. Leal’s mental conditions adequately because it acknowledged them. [1]The opinion contains some very involved graphics with various symbols and “legends,” including a very special image of some “crystals,” to demonstrate the connection between Mr. Leal and the sale, which might suggest to reasonable minds that this connection was in fact rather attenuated. 2 These highly relevant facts, which reasonable minds might expect the panel to feature at the forefront of the opinion, are in fact buried deep in the discussion.