Felon in possession conviction upheld; Court rejects Fourth Amendment, Miranda claims

United States v. Goebel, 959 F.3d 1259 (10th Cir. 2020) (Fourth Amendment, Miranda) A law enforcement officer heard a report about a reckless driver around 2:45 am; shortly thereafter (about 3:30 am), the officer saw in his rear view mirror a car make an “abrupt” turn in a “high-crime” neighborhood. The officer decided to follow the car. He saw it pull into a driveway (so he stopped some distance away to “observe.”) The driver, Mr. Goebel, got out of the car and go through a gate to the backyard. The officer pulled forward, blocked the car in the driveway, and got the license plate number. He also saw a front-seat passenger, no lights in the house, and a door to a van also parked in the driveway had an open door. He then moved his car so it was no longer blocking the driveway. The front seat passenger got out of the car and started towards the officer, who got out of his car, and spoke to the passenger. The passenger didn’t know the address of the house. Mr. Goebel returned from the backyard and started to get into the driver’s seat. The officer ordered him (and the passenger) to stand on the sidewalk and began to ask why they were there, what the address was, and so on. The officer was not satisfied with the answers he received (that they were there to give Joseph a ride into work and were told to go around to a side door). The officer goes to talk to the back seat passenger, who was just getting a ride home and knows nothing about nothing. Dispatch gets back to him; Mr. Goebel is on probation and had felony convictions. The officer knocks on the door of the house – apparently it took a bit before anyone responded. Homeowner says there is no one named Joseph there, she doesn’t know the people in front of her house, and thought all the doors on the van were closed. She gives permission to search van and backyard. The officer cuffs Mr. Goebel, tells him he’s being detained ‘cause he’s shifty (cop suspicious of auto-burglary and trespass). Mr. Goebel denies wrongdoing and reiterates they’re there to pick-up Joseph. Officer Barleen searches backyard, which has a gate that leads to an alley. The gate is ajar so he searches the alley. And in the alley, there is gun. Mr. Goebel is arrested, Mirandized, and says he knows his rights, and says doesn’t know anything about a gun, admits nothing. (This sort of conversation repeats at police station). Fourth Amendment The district court stated that it must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government. The Tenth agrees this is the wrong standard, but it wasn’t objected to at the district court level, and was not raised as plain error, so it was waived. But goes ahead and does the plain error analysis; only facts about Mr. Goebel’s driving were disputed. The Tenth Circuit holds that there is no showing how the incorrect standard affected those disputes and no showing that those facts were dispositive to reasonable suspicion analysis. First, the Tenth declares that Goebel was not seized when the cop blocked the driveway – primarily relying on the fact that Goebel was not in the driver’s seat (standard is whether under a totality of circumstances “the police conduct would have communicated to a reasonable person that he was not at liberty to ignore the police presence and go about his business.” 959 F.3d at 1266). Tacitly admitting that maybe there was no reasonable suspicion when the officer blocked the driveway, the Court found reasonable suspicion by the time Mr. Goebel returns from the backyard because 1) it’s weird to go directly into the backyard at 3:30 am; 2) it’s a” high-crime” neighborhood; 3) the passenger got out of the car to talk to him; 4) passenger didn’t know the address; 5) there were no lights on in the house and the door to the van was open; and 6) Mr. Goebel drove evasively. The Court rejects the argument that a police officer must accept a reasonable explanation of suspicious facts and adds in that this was not a reasonable explanation. Nor did the officer extend the stop unreasonably – he found the gun within 17 minutes. And even if it was error to order Mr. Goebel to wait on the sidewalk – that was not the but-for cause of finding the gun. Therefore, it would not be suppressed. Miranda Despite identifying two conversations on the sidewalk – one when Mr. Goebel returns from the backyard and a second with Mr. Goebel handcuffed but before being Mirandized, the Tenth Circuit only holds Mr. Goebel is not in custody so no Miranda warning was necessary. It does not explain how being handcuffed by police means you are not actually in custody. Instead, it says the conversation was short, on a public sidewalk, and the cop was polite and didn’t make any threats. As for the two remaining statements after being Mirandized, Mr. Goebel's waiver was voluntary. Finally, he never actually said anything incriminating.