Defendant's Confrontation Rights Were Not Violated When State Introduced Depo of Witness at Trial
Acosta v. Raemisch, 877 F.3d 918 (12/15/17) (Col.) - The 10th denies ยง 2254 habeas relief, rejecting arguments that the state didn't do enough to produce a witness for Confrontation Clause purposes and that the denial of Mr. Acosta's right to counsel was structural error. The only eyewitness to the killing of the victim was difficult to track down. She kept disappearing whenever she was released from custody. In light of that fact, she was deposed. After not appearing for a hearing, she was arrested and kept in custody so she could testify at Mr. Acosta's co-defendant's trial. The jury convicted the co-defendant of manslaughter. The eyewitness was released after Mr. Acosta's trial was delayed due to his counsel's conflict and the need to get new counsel. At a hearing without counsel, Mr. Acosta waived his right to a speedy trial and at a later hearing outside of his and his counsel's presence, the eyewitness was released. True to form, the eyewitness disappeared. Unbeknownst to the prosecution, she was arrested by local officers on a different matter on the same day her deposition was introduced into evidence at Mr. Acosta's trial. The jury convicted Mr. Acosta of first-degree murder.
The 10th holds it was reasonable for the state courts to find the state tried enough to get the eyewitness to testify at Mr. Acosta's trial where the state investigators: checked the eyewitness's last known addresses; visited the post office to see if the eyewitness filed a change of address form [not likely]; got information the eyewitness had no permanent address, lived in the streets and was hiding to avoid testifying; spoke twice a week with the eyewitness's cooperative grandfather; enlisted the aid of a unit that looked for the eyewitness on the streets in areas she was known to frequent; and searched for the eyewitness along a certain street she had frequented. The 10th says it doesn't matter whether the trial court should have done a better job of keeping tabs on the eyewitness. What mattered is whether the prosecution engaged in a good-faith effort to produce her for trial. Even though there were other things the state could have done, like check arrest records. The Sixth Amendment doesn't require the prosecution to exhaust every possible means of producing a witness. So the state's finding of law that there was good faith was reasonable. The admission of the deposition didn't violate the Confrontation Clause.
The 10th assumes Mr. Acosta's right to counsel was violated at the hearings where he waived his speedy trial rights and where the eyewitness was released. The error was not structural, the 10th rules. There is such an error only when it "infects the entire trial process," the 10th says. Here Mr. Acosta had counsel all the time after those two hearings. The counsel denial didn't contaminate the rest of the proceedings, the 10th holds, and so that's good enough to avoid habeas relief. The 10th is okay with the trial court's finding that Mr. Acosta knowingly waived his right to a speedy trial, even though he did so without counsel. The 10th also sees no legitimate complaint that the lack of counsel caused the loss of the eyewitness's testimony. There was no Confrontation Clause violation. The 10th is convinced the error had no impact on the verdict.
The 10th holds it was reasonable for the state courts to find the state tried enough to get the eyewitness to testify at Mr. Acosta's trial where the state investigators: checked the eyewitness's last known addresses; visited the post office to see if the eyewitness filed a change of address form [not likely]; got information the eyewitness had no permanent address, lived in the streets and was hiding to avoid testifying; spoke twice a week with the eyewitness's cooperative grandfather; enlisted the aid of a unit that looked for the eyewitness on the streets in areas she was known to frequent; and searched for the eyewitness along a certain street she had frequented. The 10th says it doesn't matter whether the trial court should have done a better job of keeping tabs on the eyewitness. What mattered is whether the prosecution engaged in a good-faith effort to produce her for trial. Even though there were other things the state could have done, like check arrest records. The Sixth Amendment doesn't require the prosecution to exhaust every possible means of producing a witness. So the state's finding of law that there was good faith was reasonable. The admission of the deposition didn't violate the Confrontation Clause.
The 10th assumes Mr. Acosta's right to counsel was violated at the hearings where he waived his speedy trial rights and where the eyewitness was released. The error was not structural, the 10th rules. There is such an error only when it "infects the entire trial process," the 10th says. Here Mr. Acosta had counsel all the time after those two hearings. The counsel denial didn't contaminate the rest of the proceedings, the 10th holds, and so that's good enough to avoid habeas relief. The 10th is okay with the trial court's finding that Mr. Acosta knowingly waived his right to a speedy trial, even though he did so without counsel. The 10th also sees no legitimate complaint that the lack of counsel caused the loss of the eyewitness's testimony. There was no Confrontation Clause violation. The 10th is convinced the error had no impact on the verdict.
posted by Anonymous at 3:14 PM
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