2255 Movant Wins Timeliness, Procedural Default Issues, But Loses on the Merits

U.S. v. Snyder, 871 F.3d 1122 (9/21/17) (Wyo.Published) - With respect to Johnson and 28 USC § 2255, the 10th starts off with good timeliness and procedural default rulings. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3), a defendant's § 2255 motion is timely if filed within a year of "the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review." We all know Johnson established the "newly recognized" part of (f)(3) and Welch established the retroactive part. Nonetheless, the district court held Mr. Snyder's motion was untimely because he was not entitled to relief under Johnson. The 10th says this is not the correct approach. Section (f)(3) only refers to the defendant "asserting" a right. It doesn't require that the defendant's reliance on the asserted right be meritorious. Here Mr. Snyder asserted he was entitled to relief under Johnson and Johnson fulfills all the requirements under (f)(3).

The motion was also not precluded by procedural default, the 10th says. Mr. Snyder had cause and prejudice with respect to failing to raise his issue on direct appeal. The cause was that "no one could reasonably have anticipated Johnson," even in 2005, the time for Mr. Snyder's appeal, when the S. Ct. had yet to explicitly say the residual clause wasn't too vague as it did later in James and Sykes. Significantly, the 10th notes, Johnson said it overruled James and Sykes. And there was actual prejudice because, if Mr. Snyder is correct about Johnson's effect on his ACCA sentence, he certainly would be entitled to relief since his sentence would be above the maximum.

But, Mr. Snyder's argument falters at the merits step, according to the 10th. The district court found as a matter of historical fact that it didn't apply the residual clause when it sentenced Mr. Snyder under the ACCA. The district court found it considered Mr. Snyder's residential burglaries to be "burglaries" under the enumerated clause of 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), not the residual clause. The 10th affirms that finding. It explains it is possible to determine a sentencing court didn't rely on the residual clause---even when the sentencing record is unclear---by looking to "the relevant background legal environment at the time of sentencing." So, if, at the time of the sentencing, precedent said "crime Z" was a "violent felony" under the force clause, we can say the sentencing court didn't rely on the residual clause when it considered "crime Z" a "violent felony." Here, in light of Taylor, "there would have been little dispute at the time of Mr. Snyder's sentencing that his two Wyoming burglary convictions involving occupied structures fell within the ACCA's enumerated clause," not the residual clause. This is so, the 10th explains, because back in those days we used the modified categorical approach when a statute prohibited entry into both structures and vehicles. Looking at Mr. Snyder's documents showed he was convicted of entering structures, not vehicles. And there was never any mention of the residual clause with respect to Mr. Snyder's priors. So the 10th says it can't disagree with the district court's finding it didn't rely on the residual clause. Never mind Mathis might very well have nixed using the categorical approach. Never mind Mathis said it was just applying S Ct. precedent since the ACCA was created. What matters is it was perfectly okay back when he was sentenced under an unlawful approach. The 10th has used Snyder on many occasions to reject § 2255 Johnson claims regardless of whether the ACCA sentences are illegal under Mathis or other post-sentencing precedent.