Meth Defendant's Arguments Rejected
United States v. Hood, ___ F.3d ___ , 2010 WL 3227820 (10th Cir. 2010) (Utah). Convicted after trial of possession with intent to distribute more than 50 grams of meth, and sentenced to life imprisonment, the defendant raised three arguments to no avail.
1. District court correctly denied motion to dismiss the indictment for government’s destruction of bags in which meth found and commingling amounts. D hypothesized that the destroyed evidence could potentially be exculpatory and demonstrate that cops might have mixed drugs seized from informant/girlfriend with his, and that he had less than 50 gr. Because he could only state potentially exculpatory value to the evidence he did not meet Trombetta Due Process standard (if exculpatory value is only potential, then must show bad faith). He could not then meet the Youngblood standard because he conceded that the officers did not act in bad faith. COA rejected D’s reliance on Steven’s Youngblood concurrence that if evidence is so critical to defense then one need not show bad faith, because Stevens’ was not the majority voice, and the evidence not critical.
2. COA refuses to apply civil standard for imposing sanctions when evidence is spoiled, finding no plain error in the d ct’s not sua sponte applying it.
3. The failure of the Information to list the correct court and place of a prior drug conviction to support a § 851 enhancement of life imprisonment was harmless. COA determines even if the error was a non-correctable non-clerical error, it could still find it harmless. Citing to Gonzales-Lerma, 14 F.3d 1479, the COA said that such information can still provide sufficient notice of the government’s intent to seek enhancement based on the conviction. Here, D did not show that he was prejudiced. In his sentencing objections, he acknowledged a drug conviction associated with his name with the particulars in the error-filled entry in the Information.
4. The district court generally has no duty to sua sponte inquire into problems with the attorney client relationship, especially when allegations, like the ones made by D at sentencing, are vague and contradictory. D can raise any ineffective assistance issues in a post-conviction action.
1. District court correctly denied motion to dismiss the indictment for government’s destruction of bags in which meth found and commingling amounts. D hypothesized that the destroyed evidence could potentially be exculpatory and demonstrate that cops might have mixed drugs seized from informant/girlfriend with his, and that he had less than 50 gr. Because he could only state potentially exculpatory value to the evidence he did not meet Trombetta Due Process standard (if exculpatory value is only potential, then must show bad faith). He could not then meet the Youngblood standard because he conceded that the officers did not act in bad faith. COA rejected D’s reliance on Steven’s Youngblood concurrence that if evidence is so critical to defense then one need not show bad faith, because Stevens’ was not the majority voice, and the evidence not critical.
2. COA refuses to apply civil standard for imposing sanctions when evidence is spoiled, finding no plain error in the d ct’s not sua sponte applying it.
3. The failure of the Information to list the correct court and place of a prior drug conviction to support a § 851 enhancement of life imprisonment was harmless. COA determines even if the error was a non-correctable non-clerical error, it could still find it harmless. Citing to Gonzales-Lerma, 14 F.3d 1479, the COA said that such information can still provide sufficient notice of the government’s intent to seek enhancement based on the conviction. Here, D did not show that he was prejudiced. In his sentencing objections, he acknowledged a drug conviction associated with his name with the particulars in the error-filled entry in the Information.
4. The district court generally has no duty to sua sponte inquire into problems with the attorney client relationship, especially when allegations, like the ones made by D at sentencing, are vague and contradictory. D can raise any ineffective assistance issues in a post-conviction action.
posted by Anonymous at 3:12 PM
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