Unpublished Decisions
U.S. v. Liner, 2010 WL 517640 (2/12/10) (unpub'd) - Troubling comment: "We find the defendant's arguments that his sentence was manifestly substantively unreasonable to be so wholly without merit that we are compelled to remind defense counsel of his ethical obligation not to present frivolous arguments to this court."
U.S. v. Requejo, 2010 WL 446997 (2/10/10) (unpub'd) - The district court's error in not making the proper perjury findings to justify an obstruction-of-justice enhancement was harmless because the court sentenced below what the guideline range would have been if no such enhancement had been applied. Nothing in the record suggested the court would have imposed a lower sentence had it not applied the enhancement [thus, in effect, switching the burden regarding harmlessness to the defendant].
U.S. v. Turner, 2010 WL 517621 (2/12/10) (unpub'd) - There were plain errors with respect to the improper certification of pretrial transcripts, the magistrate's advice to the defendant and the lack of written detention findings, but they had no substantial effect on the defendant's substantial rights. The defendant saying "I just feel like [my attorney] is not really working for me" did not trigger the right to a hearing to consider appointing substitute counsel, because there was no evidence of a "complete breakdown" in the attorney-client relationship.
Duty v. Workman, No. 07-7073 (2/12/10) (unpub'd) - Another affirmance of an Oklahoma capital conviction with bizarre, horrific facts. The petitioner tricked a cellmate into allowing himself to be bound [supposedly to get the petitioner sent to segregation] and then strangled him to death. The petitioner then sent a subsequently-intercepted letter to the cellmate's mother telling her he just killed her son in a planned way, explaining how he did it, saying he did the victim a favor because he was "too stupid to live" and would have been in and out of prison all his life anyway. The petitioner later wrote a letter to the DA offering to plead guilty to murder, but only if he would get the death sentence, and declaring that, if the DA didn't arrange to give him the sentence he deserved, he would continue to "kill again and again." The petitioner later pleaded guilty to murder and asked for the death sentence, waiving his right to present mitigation evidence. Then the victim's mother testified that she did not want the petitioner to get the death penalty, but rather to live a long time in prison thinking about what he did. The court granted the petitioner's wish. The petitioner had a change of heart alleging post-conviction that he was too depressed at the time of the plea and his counsel had not investigated sufficiently. The petitioner then alternately withdrew his petition and then reinstated it a number of times.
The 10th held the case was governed by Shriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465 (2007). Even if the petitioner had known about his depression and counsel had investigated more, he would have waived the presentation of mitigation evidence. And, anyway, the facts of the case were so horrible that the now-proffered mitigating evidence would not have changed the death verdict. Plus, the petitioner procedurally defaulted his challenge to the lethal-injection protocol, which he should have challenged when he filed his state petition.
U.S. v. Requejo, 2010 WL 446997 (2/10/10) (unpub'd) - The district court's error in not making the proper perjury findings to justify an obstruction-of-justice enhancement was harmless because the court sentenced below what the guideline range would have been if no such enhancement had been applied. Nothing in the record suggested the court would have imposed a lower sentence had it not applied the enhancement [thus, in effect, switching the burden regarding harmlessness to the defendant].
U.S. v. Turner, 2010 WL 517621 (2/12/10) (unpub'd) - There were plain errors with respect to the improper certification of pretrial transcripts, the magistrate's advice to the defendant and the lack of written detention findings, but they had no substantial effect on the defendant's substantial rights. The defendant saying "I just feel like [my attorney] is not really working for me" did not trigger the right to a hearing to consider appointing substitute counsel, because there was no evidence of a "complete breakdown" in the attorney-client relationship.
Duty v. Workman, No. 07-7073 (2/12/10) (unpub'd) - Another affirmance of an Oklahoma capital conviction with bizarre, horrific facts. The petitioner tricked a cellmate into allowing himself to be bound [supposedly to get the petitioner sent to segregation] and then strangled him to death. The petitioner then sent a subsequently-intercepted letter to the cellmate's mother telling her he just killed her son in a planned way, explaining how he did it, saying he did the victim a favor because he was "too stupid to live" and would have been in and out of prison all his life anyway. The petitioner later wrote a letter to the DA offering to plead guilty to murder, but only if he would get the death sentence, and declaring that, if the DA didn't arrange to give him the sentence he deserved, he would continue to "kill again and again." The petitioner later pleaded guilty to murder and asked for the death sentence, waiving his right to present mitigation evidence. Then the victim's mother testified that she did not want the petitioner to get the death penalty, but rather to live a long time in prison thinking about what he did. The court granted the petitioner's wish. The petitioner had a change of heart alleging post-conviction that he was too depressed at the time of the plea and his counsel had not investigated sufficiently. The petitioner then alternately withdrew his petition and then reinstated it a number of times.
The 10th held the case was governed by Shriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465 (2007). Even if the petitioner had known about his depression and counsel had investigated more, he would have waived the presentation of mitigation evidence. And, anyway, the facts of the case were so horrible that the now-proffered mitigating evidence would not have changed the death verdict. Plus, the petitioner procedurally defaulted his challenge to the lethal-injection protocol, which he should have challenged when he filed his state petition.
posted by Anonymous at 10:29 AM
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