DWI Not A Violent Felony for ACCA Purposes; Supremes Reverse the Tenth
Begay v. United States (06-11543), reversing 470 F.3d 964.
In a 6-3 opinion authored by Breyer (dissent by Alito joined by Thomas and Souter)(concurrence by Scalia), the Court decided that 18 USC Sec. 924(e), the Armed Career Criminal Act’s second clause: “is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves the use of explosives or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another” does not apply to DWI, and DWI is not a crime of violence within the ACCA. The majority followed the core argument forwarded by the defense from the get-go: ejusdem generis; that these listed examples illustrate the kind of offenses that fall within the scope of the statute, and “the statute covers only similar crimes rather than every crime that presents a serious risk” to another (emphasis in the original). DWI does not fit within the statute–it is “too unlike the ... listed examples...to believe that Congress intended” it be included. The court looks not only to statutory construction but to legislative history to support its conclusion (that is, Congress declined an opportunity to use broader, more inclusive language).
The Court importantly distinguishes the listed offenses, which involve purposeful, violent and aggressive conduct, from DWI, citing to Leocal (McConnell gets his further nod from the Supremes when it quotes his Begay dissent to this effect. McConnell was only, however, making the argument raised by M and C in their 10th Cir. briefs). Another distinguishing feature is that New Mexico DWI is a strict liability offense (although I would think that this is not a necessary requirement for an offense to be a non-qualifying offense. The Court lists obscure non-qualifying examples which have mens reas of, e.g., recklessness).
This case has applicability to any prior conviction that does not fit within clause (i), and is not an enumerated clause (ii) offense, which can be distinguished from the listed offenses along the same lines as outlined in Begay. It also brings ACCA law more in line with case law interpreting USSG 2L1.2 and 18 USC 16(b).
In a 6-3 opinion authored by Breyer (dissent by Alito joined by Thomas and Souter)(concurrence by Scalia), the Court decided that 18 USC Sec. 924(e), the Armed Career Criminal Act’s second clause: “is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves the use of explosives or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another” does not apply to DWI, and DWI is not a crime of violence within the ACCA. The majority followed the core argument forwarded by the defense from the get-go: ejusdem generis; that these listed examples illustrate the kind of offenses that fall within the scope of the statute, and “the statute covers only similar crimes rather than every crime that presents a serious risk” to another (emphasis in the original). DWI does not fit within the statute–it is “too unlike the ... listed examples...to believe that Congress intended” it be included. The court looks not only to statutory construction but to legislative history to support its conclusion (that is, Congress declined an opportunity to use broader, more inclusive language).
The Court importantly distinguishes the listed offenses, which involve purposeful, violent and aggressive conduct, from DWI, citing to Leocal (McConnell gets his further nod from the Supremes when it quotes his Begay dissent to this effect. McConnell was only, however, making the argument raised by M and C in their 10th Cir. briefs). Another distinguishing feature is that New Mexico DWI is a strict liability offense (although I would think that this is not a necessary requirement for an offense to be a non-qualifying offense. The Court lists obscure non-qualifying examples which have mens reas of, e.g., recklessness).
This case has applicability to any prior conviction that does not fit within clause (i), and is not an enumerated clause (ii) offense, which can be distinguished from the listed offenses along the same lines as outlined in Begay. It also brings ACCA law more in line with case law interpreting USSG 2L1.2 and 18 USC 16(b).
posted by Anonymous at 12:03 PM
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