COA Discusses What It Means to Be Legally Insane in Habeas Case
Diestel v. Hines, --- F.3d ----, 2007 WL 3197201 (10th Cir. Nov. 1, 1007): The Tenth Circuit affirms the denial of habeas relief to an Oklahoma habeas petitioner who was sentenced to life without parole for murder. The petitioner raised two claims: (1) the state did not present sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was sane at the time of the offense, and (2) his due-process rights were violated because the court did not instruct the jury about the consequences of a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity. Although the magistrate had recommended granting relief on the first issue but not the second, the district court denied relief both issues.
Mr. Diestel traveled from California to Oklahoma, where he located the victim at his workplace and shot him. Mr. Diestel contended that, at the time of the shooting, he was suffering from paranoid schizophrenia, which led him to believe that the victim was the evil emporer Nero who was responsible for raping a girl and setting numerous fires in California. Apparently, Mr. Diestel had known the victim in California.
The defense presented expert and lay testimony concerning Mr. Diestel's lengthy history of mental illness. The state presented lay testimony from people who observed the defendant briefly at the time of the shooting, who generally testified he was scary but calm, and expert testimony that, even if Mr. Diestel was a paranoid schizophrenic and was possibly suffering from paranoid schizophrenia on the day of the shooting, he could still understand what he was doing and that it was a criminal act. The state also presented expert testimony that revenge was a possible motive. Mr. Diestel was convicted and the state courts affirmed.
The panel discusses at length what it means to be criminally insane, rather than merely insane, and concludes that there was evidence from which the jury could conclude that Mr. Diestel was not legally insane at the time of the shooting. The court explained that Mr. Diestel was not entitled to an insanity defense if his mental illness led him to believe only that the victim was an evil man who raped women and set fires and he nonetheless understood that the community would regard the victim's murder as wrongful. He would, however, be entitled to an insanity defense if he not only thought the victim was evil, and also thought that he had a mandate from God or President Clinton to kill him or believed that the victim was not really human but actually an evil spirit. However, the evidence that he suffered from the latter delusions was much weaker than the evidence that he thought the victim was evil, so the COA concluded it was not unreasonable for the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals to conclude that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict that Mr. Diestel was legally sane.
On the second issue, Mr. Diestel had sought a jury instruction to tell the jury that, if found not guilty by reason of insanity, he would be committed to a mental hospital. The COA found that this was not a basis for relief because the trial court's decision was not clearly contrary to any federal law or Supreme Court decision.
Judge Henry concurred, saying that this was a close and difficult case, with the expert testimony "strongly suggesting" that Mr. Diestel was under the influence of hallucinations and unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his actions at the time of the murder. However, Oklahoma law (unlike the FRE) allow experts to testify as to whether a defendant had the requisite intent to commit the charged crime, and thus the testimony was properly admitted. Judge Henry was disturbed by the state court's reliance on lay witnesses who had only briefly seen the defendant at the time of the shooting. Thus, "[g]iven the above and given what Dr. Call said regarding Mr. Diestel's mental state, I cannot say that, abesnt AEDPA's strictures, I could affirm the OCCA's legal conclusion that Mr. Diestel was sane at the time of the crime."
Judge Henry also notes that, since Mr. Diestel's trial, the Oklahoma courts have essentially adopted the jury instruction he desired. But, too late for him.
Mr. Diestel traveled from California to Oklahoma, where he located the victim at his workplace and shot him. Mr. Diestel contended that, at the time of the shooting, he was suffering from paranoid schizophrenia, which led him to believe that the victim was the evil emporer Nero who was responsible for raping a girl and setting numerous fires in California. Apparently, Mr. Diestel had known the victim in California.
The defense presented expert and lay testimony concerning Mr. Diestel's lengthy history of mental illness. The state presented lay testimony from people who observed the defendant briefly at the time of the shooting, who generally testified he was scary but calm, and expert testimony that, even if Mr. Diestel was a paranoid schizophrenic and was possibly suffering from paranoid schizophrenia on the day of the shooting, he could still understand what he was doing and that it was a criminal act. The state also presented expert testimony that revenge was a possible motive. Mr. Diestel was convicted and the state courts affirmed.
The panel discusses at length what it means to be criminally insane, rather than merely insane, and concludes that there was evidence from which the jury could conclude that Mr. Diestel was not legally insane at the time of the shooting. The court explained that Mr. Diestel was not entitled to an insanity defense if his mental illness led him to believe only that the victim was an evil man who raped women and set fires and he nonetheless understood that the community would regard the victim's murder as wrongful. He would, however, be entitled to an insanity defense if he not only thought the victim was evil, and also thought that he had a mandate from God or President Clinton to kill him or believed that the victim was not really human but actually an evil spirit. However, the evidence that he suffered from the latter delusions was much weaker than the evidence that he thought the victim was evil, so the COA concluded it was not unreasonable for the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals to conclude that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict that Mr. Diestel was legally sane.
On the second issue, Mr. Diestel had sought a jury instruction to tell the jury that, if found not guilty by reason of insanity, he would be committed to a mental hospital. The COA found that this was not a basis for relief because the trial court's decision was not clearly contrary to any federal law or Supreme Court decision.
Judge Henry concurred, saying that this was a close and difficult case, with the expert testimony "strongly suggesting" that Mr. Diestel was under the influence of hallucinations and unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his actions at the time of the murder. However, Oklahoma law (unlike the FRE) allow experts to testify as to whether a defendant had the requisite intent to commit the charged crime, and thus the testimony was properly admitted. Judge Henry was disturbed by the state court's reliance on lay witnesses who had only briefly seen the defendant at the time of the shooting. Thus, "[g]iven the above and given what Dr. Call said regarding Mr. Diestel's mental state, I cannot say that, abesnt AEDPA's strictures, I could affirm the OCCA's legal conclusion that Mr. Diestel was sane at the time of the crime."
Judge Henry also notes that, since Mr. Diestel's trial, the Oklahoma courts have essentially adopted the jury instruction he desired. But, too late for him.
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