Immediate Destruction of Meth Lab Under Dep't Policy Not a Due Process Violation
United States v. Beckstead, No. 05-4178 (10th Cir. Sept. 5, 2007)
1. Immediate destruction of meth lab under standard police department policy, which may have deprived Defendant of exculpatory evidence (that fingerprints were not his; that independent weighing of drug quantities would show less drugs than alleged) was not a violation of due process when Defendant could not show that police destroyed the evidence in bad faith. Destruction of evidence according to a standard policy generally precludes a finding of bad faith absent compelling circumstances.
No specific request by Defendant to preserve the evidence though D did not have an opportunity to make such a request before it was destroyed. Defendant’s claim that it was exculpatory was conclusory and there was no objective evidence of its exculpatory nature to put the government on notice. Though the evidence was central to the case, the government had an innocent explanation for its destruction.
2. Defendant waived his 4th Amendment standing argument by raising it for the first time in his reply brief. If addressed on the merits, he had no standing to object to the search of his girlfriend’s apartment. Likewise, he presented a curt, conclusory challenge to the search of his car in his briefs, without citing authority, and waived his argument on that point. If addressed on the merits, search of the car, which was unoccupied at the time and parked in the apartment complex lot, came within the automobile exception. Police, who looked into the car and saw glassware consistent with the manufacture of meth; had a tip; found meth in the nearby apartment; and linked Defendant to the car and the apartment, had PC to believe the car contained contraband. Although there was no exigency associated with the car in this case, police still could conduct a warrantless search.
1. Immediate destruction of meth lab under standard police department policy, which may have deprived Defendant of exculpatory evidence (that fingerprints were not his; that independent weighing of drug quantities would show less drugs than alleged) was not a violation of due process when Defendant could not show that police destroyed the evidence in bad faith. Destruction of evidence according to a standard policy generally precludes a finding of bad faith absent compelling circumstances.
No specific request by Defendant to preserve the evidence though D did not have an opportunity to make such a request before it was destroyed. Defendant’s claim that it was exculpatory was conclusory and there was no objective evidence of its exculpatory nature to put the government on notice. Though the evidence was central to the case, the government had an innocent explanation for its destruction.
2. Defendant waived his 4th Amendment standing argument by raising it for the first time in his reply brief. If addressed on the merits, he had no standing to object to the search of his girlfriend’s apartment. Likewise, he presented a curt, conclusory challenge to the search of his car in his briefs, without citing authority, and waived his argument on that point. If addressed on the merits, search of the car, which was unoccupied at the time and parked in the apartment complex lot, came within the automobile exception. Police, who looked into the car and saw glassware consistent with the manufacture of meth; had a tip; found meth in the nearby apartment; and linked Defendant to the car and the apartment, had PC to believe the car contained contraband. Although there was no exigency associated with the car in this case, police still could conduct a warrantless search.
posted by Anonymous at 1:52 PM
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