Presumption that a Guidelines Sentence is Reasonable Upheld for Appellate Review
Rita v. United States, --- U.S. ----, 2007 WL 1772146 (June 21, 2007)
In an 8-1 decision (Souter dissenting), the Supreme Court (Breyer) upholds the presumption that a guidelines sentence is reasonable–courts of appeal are allowed to employ the presumption when reviewing a challenge to the reasonableness of a within-guidelines sentence.
A read of the facts of the case, the sentencing in district court, and the argument on appeal, shows that this was a clean, straightforward, typical request by a defendant for a below-guidelines sentence, both as a departure and as a variance outside of the guidelines, for solid mitigating factors. The district court sentenced at the low end of the USSG, and Defendant appealed, arguing that the sentence was unreasonable because it did not adequately take account his history and characteristics, and it violated the parsimony provision. The Fourth Circuit upheld the sentence applying the presumption of reasonableness.
The presumption is an appellate tool, it is permissible, but it is not binding–it does not put any burden on one side or another. Rather, it “reflects the fact that, by the time an appeals court is considering a within-Guidelines sentence on review, both the sentencing judge and the Sentencing Commission will have reached the same conclusion as to the proper sentence in the particular case. That double determination significantly increases the likelihood that the sentence is a reasonable one.”
The Court continues with this “in tandem” image of the courts and the Commission as institutions in the business of fashioning fair sentences, and emphasizes the guideline mission of attaining uniformity and proportionality in federal sentencing.
Finally, the Court says that there is nothing about the presumption that violates the 6th Amendment: even if it increases the likelihood that the judge, not the jury, will find “sentencing facts.” The Court also weighs in on the need for the district court to state its reasons, but states that what the judge in this case said was legally sufficient, though he “could have said more.” (So, does not bode well on the procedural argument. )
Stevens and Ginsburg joined in a concurrence, and Scalia and Thomas joined in a separate concurrence.
Souter’s dissent: “I would therefore reject the presumption of reasonableness adopted in this case, not because it is pernicious in and of itself, but because I do not think we can recognize such a presumption and still retain the full effect of Apprendi in aid of the Sixth Amendment guarantee.” And, throwing it back to Congress, post-Booker constitutional decision, “At this point, only Congress can make good on both its enacted policy of mandatory Guidelines sentencing and the guarantee of a robust right of jury trial.”
In an 8-1 decision (Souter dissenting), the Supreme Court (Breyer) upholds the presumption that a guidelines sentence is reasonable–courts of appeal are allowed to employ the presumption when reviewing a challenge to the reasonableness of a within-guidelines sentence.
A read of the facts of the case, the sentencing in district court, and the argument on appeal, shows that this was a clean, straightforward, typical request by a defendant for a below-guidelines sentence, both as a departure and as a variance outside of the guidelines, for solid mitigating factors. The district court sentenced at the low end of the USSG, and Defendant appealed, arguing that the sentence was unreasonable because it did not adequately take account his history and characteristics, and it violated the parsimony provision. The Fourth Circuit upheld the sentence applying the presumption of reasonableness.
The presumption is an appellate tool, it is permissible, but it is not binding–it does not put any burden on one side or another. Rather, it “reflects the fact that, by the time an appeals court is considering a within-Guidelines sentence on review, both the sentencing judge and the Sentencing Commission will have reached the same conclusion as to the proper sentence in the particular case. That double determination significantly increases the likelihood that the sentence is a reasonable one.”
The Court continues with this “in tandem” image of the courts and the Commission as institutions in the business of fashioning fair sentences, and emphasizes the guideline mission of attaining uniformity and proportionality in federal sentencing.
Finally, the Court says that there is nothing about the presumption that violates the 6th Amendment: even if it increases the likelihood that the judge, not the jury, will find “sentencing facts.” The Court also weighs in on the need for the district court to state its reasons, but states that what the judge in this case said was legally sufficient, though he “could have said more.” (So, does not bode well on the procedural argument. )
Stevens and Ginsburg joined in a concurrence, and Scalia and Thomas joined in a separate concurrence.
Souter’s dissent: “I would therefore reject the presumption of reasonableness adopted in this case, not because it is pernicious in and of itself, but because I do not think we can recognize such a presumption and still retain the full effect of Apprendi in aid of the Sixth Amendment guarantee.” And, throwing it back to Congress, post-Booker constitutional decision, “At this point, only Congress can make good on both its enacted policy of mandatory Guidelines sentencing and the guarantee of a robust right of jury trial.”
posted by Anonymous at 10:14 AM
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