Thursday, February 22, 2007

Capital Habeas Petitioner Gets Reversal

Anderson v. Sirmons, --- F.3d ----, 2007 WL 521173 (10th Cir. Feb. 21, 2007).

Murphy authored the opinion that found the Oklahoma P had received ineffective assistance during the penalty phase of the case (P was represented by FPD in W. Ok.).

WARNING: This paragraph for habe-o-philes only: P did not raise IAC in state because appellate counsel was not conflict free. The fed dist ct sent P back to state court to pursue the IAC in a state habeas, and the FPD office in OK sent an attorney to state court ONLY to ask for appointment of conflict-free counsel on the state habeas (“the only feasible means to adequately call this matter to the state court's attention.”). Appointed state counsel asked for and was denied additional time to investigate the IAC at penalty phase issue and file a successor petition, and state court said anyway the successor petition would be untimely, so counsel withdrew, and P filed to reinstate his federal habeas. Read the opinion for the exhaustion and procedural bar arguments and resolutions at this juncture. Fed district court found no PB, and futility excused the exhaustion issue, and 10th Cir. Upheld this determination.

The merits: 10th reaffirms that its duty is to be particularly vigilant when reviewing a death case. State trial counsel devoted all of his efforts to the guilt phase of case, and little to investigating mitigation for the penalty phase. GREAT record development in the federal habeas case regarding what was NOT done by trial counsel in terms of investigation for the penalty phase, the wealth of mitigation evidence there was to be found. The 10th stated that this was not a matter of strategic choice by counsel, it was a failure to investigate.

The 10th overruled the dist ct determination regarding the 2d Strickland prong, finding that P was prejudiced by the failure to investigate and therefore present mitigation evidence. Regardless of how overwhelming the evidence of guilt and how overwhelming the evidence of the heinous nature of the offense, the 10th articulated this reasoning and standard: “the absence of this readily available mitigation evidence left the jury with no explanation for the murders other than the prosecution's assertion Anderson was “evil.” Although the case against Anderson was strong and the murders in this case were horrific, courts have not hesitated to grant relief in similar circumstances where the absence of available mitigation evidence left the jury with a “pitifully incomplete” picture of the defendant. Had the jury been presented a complete picture of Anderson's background and history, there is a reasonable probability at least one juror would have struck a different balance between the mitigating and aggravating factors.”