Aiding and Abetting a Theft Offense Is An Aggravated Felony, Supreme Court Holds
Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, --- S.Ct. ----, 2007 WL 98723 (Jan. 17, 2007)
In an 8-1 decision (Stevens dissent–he would have remanded the important part to the court of appeals), the Supremes, in another post-Taylor decision (the Taylor “categorical” approach: to determine the nature of a criminal statute–e.g. burglary–you review the elements of the statute to determine if the statute fits within the generic crime of burglary or whether the elements broadly include more than generic burglary), held that aiding and abetting a theft is itself a crime that falls within the generic definition of theft, reversing the Ninth Circuit.
Petitioner was deemed removable because of a conviction for aiding and abetting a car theft contrary to a California law (which included “aiding and abetting” within the statute outlawing car theft); federal law allows removal for conviction of a theft offense.
The Court first recognized that at common law and in all jurisdictions, principals, aiders and abettors, and accessories before the fact are all treated the same in terms of culpability. The fact that under California law an A&A is held “liable for the natural and reasonable or probable consequences of any act that he knowingly aided or encouraged” does not expand and broaden the generic offense of theft, in this case, to include offenses that are not generic theft–it does not criminalize conduct that would not be considered generic theft.
The wiggle room for future cases: The litigant can show “a realistic probability” that the State would apply its statute to conduct that falls outside the generic definition of a crime. The litigant can do that in one of two ways. First, by showing that the jurisdiction has applied it in the past in an expansive fashion. The Court said that only 10 jurisdictions have rejected the “natural and reasonable consequences” expansive view of A&A, so most jurisdictions, including the Feds, retain the theoretical possibility of an overly-expansive view. The Court conceded that theoretically a litigant can show something “special” about the jurisdiction’s version of the doctrine-“for example, that [the jurisdiction] in applying it criminalizes conduct that most other States would not consider [the offense].”I.e., look at decided cases from that jurisdiction.
The second way a litigant can show that realistic possibility, is by showing that the statute was so applied in his own case. But he must at least point to his own case (or other cases) in which the state courts in fact did apply the statute in the special (nongeneric) manner for which he argues.
In an 8-1 decision (Stevens dissent–he would have remanded the important part to the court of appeals), the Supremes, in another post-Taylor decision (the Taylor “categorical” approach: to determine the nature of a criminal statute–e.g. burglary–you review the elements of the statute to determine if the statute fits within the generic crime of burglary or whether the elements broadly include more than generic burglary), held that aiding and abetting a theft is itself a crime that falls within the generic definition of theft, reversing the Ninth Circuit.
Petitioner was deemed removable because of a conviction for aiding and abetting a car theft contrary to a California law (which included “aiding and abetting” within the statute outlawing car theft); federal law allows removal for conviction of a theft offense.
The Court first recognized that at common law and in all jurisdictions, principals, aiders and abettors, and accessories before the fact are all treated the same in terms of culpability. The fact that under California law an A&A is held “liable for the natural and reasonable or probable consequences of any act that he knowingly aided or encouraged” does not expand and broaden the generic offense of theft, in this case, to include offenses that are not generic theft–it does not criminalize conduct that would not be considered generic theft.
The wiggle room for future cases: The litigant can show “a realistic probability” that the State would apply its statute to conduct that falls outside the generic definition of a crime. The litigant can do that in one of two ways. First, by showing that the jurisdiction has applied it in the past in an expansive fashion. The Court said that only 10 jurisdictions have rejected the “natural and reasonable consequences” expansive view of A&A, so most jurisdictions, including the Feds, retain the theoretical possibility of an overly-expansive view. The Court conceded that theoretically a litigant can show something “special” about the jurisdiction’s version of the doctrine-“for example, that [the jurisdiction] in applying it criminalizes conduct that most other States would not consider [the offense].”I.e., look at decided cases from that jurisdiction.
The second way a litigant can show that realistic possibility, is by showing that the statute was so applied in his own case. But he must at least point to his own case (or other cases) in which the state courts in fact did apply the statute in the special (nongeneric) manner for which he argues.
posted by Anonymous at 12:54 PM
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