Habeas petition granted on Confrontation issue!
Stevens v. Ortiz, --- F.3d ----, 2006 WL 2962796 (10th Cir. October 18, 2006)
Over Plaintiff’s objection, the Colorado trial court allowed into evidence against Plaintiff, being tried on Murder 1, an in-custody confession by an accomplice that the accomplice had done the killing at Plaintiff’s direction. That accomplice did not testify at trial. The CO court admitted the statement under R. 804(b)(3)–hearsay that is not excluded because contrary to the declarant’s penal interest. It was the only direct evidence of P’s involvement. The jury convicted Plaintiff, and the CO S.Ct. upheld the conviction because, while the statement did not fall within a firmly rooted hearsay exception, it was admissible because it contained “sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness.”
The federal district court did a not particularly better job. Applying de novo review (it found the CO decision clearly contrary to est. federal law), it STILL found no confrontation problem: the accomplice’s statement was reliable. It was truly self-inculpatory, detailed, not offered in exchange for leniency, based upon his personal knowledge of the events, was not given in retaliation against Plaintiff and given when the accomplice was mentally and physically stable.
The 10th did not apply Crawford, because it was not law at the time the CO court ruled, and Crawford is not retroactive (but did call on Crawford to point out how difficult the “particular guarantees of trustworthiness” standard was).
The 10th easily dispatched the CO decision as clearly contrary to established federal law: the CO court incorrectly determined trustworthiness by looking to other evidence that corroborated the confession, by looking to the voluntariness of the confession; by looking to how self-inculpatory the confession was (S. Ct. precedent rejects this ground when the same confession inculpates another–NOT a firmly rooted exception); absence of a promise of leniency.
Applying de novo review, the 10th finds factors which undermined any determination that the accomplice’s confession was reliable: most importantly, it was made while he was in custody; he constantly minimized his own role and shifted major blame to Plaintiff; he initially, in the first two-thirds of the confession, did totally exculpate himself before confessing; leniency was promised to his girlfriend; the manner of the police interrogation.
Over Plaintiff’s objection, the Colorado trial court allowed into evidence against Plaintiff, being tried on Murder 1, an in-custody confession by an accomplice that the accomplice had done the killing at Plaintiff’s direction. That accomplice did not testify at trial. The CO court admitted the statement under R. 804(b)(3)–hearsay that is not excluded because contrary to the declarant’s penal interest. It was the only direct evidence of P’s involvement. The jury convicted Plaintiff, and the CO S.Ct. upheld the conviction because, while the statement did not fall within a firmly rooted hearsay exception, it was admissible because it contained “sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness.”
The federal district court did a not particularly better job. Applying de novo review (it found the CO decision clearly contrary to est. federal law), it STILL found no confrontation problem: the accomplice’s statement was reliable. It was truly self-inculpatory, detailed, not offered in exchange for leniency, based upon his personal knowledge of the events, was not given in retaliation against Plaintiff and given when the accomplice was mentally and physically stable.
The 10th did not apply Crawford, because it was not law at the time the CO court ruled, and Crawford is not retroactive (but did call on Crawford to point out how difficult the “particular guarantees of trustworthiness” standard was).
The 10th easily dispatched the CO decision as clearly contrary to established federal law: the CO court incorrectly determined trustworthiness by looking to other evidence that corroborated the confession, by looking to the voluntariness of the confession; by looking to how self-inculpatory the confession was (S. Ct. precedent rejects this ground when the same confession inculpates another–NOT a firmly rooted exception); absence of a promise of leniency.
Applying de novo review, the 10th finds factors which undermined any determination that the accomplice’s confession was reliable: most importantly, it was made while he was in custody; he constantly minimized his own role and shifted major blame to Plaintiff; he initially, in the first two-thirds of the confession, did totally exculpate himself before confessing; leniency was promised to his girlfriend; the manner of the police interrogation.
posted by Anonymous at 10:20 AM
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