10th Circuit Lays Out Procedure for Dealing with Rule 60(b) Motions in Habeas Cases

Spitznas v. Boone, 2006 WL 2789868 (9/29/06) - Big news in the habeas world, [not to be confused with the real world]. The 10th decides how to deal with Rule 60(b) motions (i.e., motions filed to reopen final habeas decisions), in light of the S.Ct.'s rejection in Gonzales v. Crosby, 125 S.Ct. 2641 (2005), of the 10th's prior rule to consider every 60(b) motion to be a successive petition. A district court should assess each 60(b) claim to see if it (1) asserts or reasserts a basis for habeas relief, (which makes it a successive claim) or (2) challenges a procedural ruling, (e.g. statute of limitations), or defect in the integrity of the prior federal habeas proceeding that does not inextricably lead to a merits-based attack on the prior disposition, (which makes it a "true" 60(b) claim). The d.ct. should decide for itself a true 60(b) claim and send a successive claim to the 10th to exercise its gatekeeping function to reject every successive claim under the ridiculously stringent successive petition standards of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b). The 10th rejected the holdings of a couple of circuit courts that a petitioner could not mix a 60(b) motion with successive and true 60(b) claims. It's okay, the 10th says, for the d.ct. to divide up the claims on its own and decide some and transfer others to the 10th. A certificate of appealability ("COA") is required to appeal the denial of a true 60(b) motion. No COA is required for a transfer to the 10th for a successive petition determination.

In this case, the petitioner's complaint that the d.ct. had failed to rule on one of his claims was a procedural claim that constituted a true 60(b) claim. The 10th remanded for the d.ct. to decide if the prior habeas denial should be vacated under 60(b) and, if so, whether habeas relief was warranted. The petitioner's other claim was a new substantive claim based on new facts and, thus, constituted a successive claim. The petitioner did not meet the successive petition standard for relief because the petitioner could have discovered the "new" facts by the time he filed his initial habeas petition.