Evidence Insufficient to Support Retaliation Conviction
Torres v. Lytle, --- F.3d ----, 2006 WL 2604610 (10th Cir. Sept. 12, 2006)
Mr. Torres gets relief on his habeas petition.
Issue: was there sufficient evidence at the state trial to prove that P's threatening letter to V was in retaliation for V's giving information to authorities that P committed a felony arson? Answer: No.
P had been allegedly involved in two arsons in relation to V: an earlier felony arson, and a later misdemeanor arson. P was tried on the misdemeanor arson and after the misdemeanor trial, P wrote the threatening letter. At P’s subsequent trial for retaliation against a witness (the subject of this habeas case), the state presented no evidence that P had any knowledge that V had reported the earlier felony arson to authorities (reporting a felony was an element of the retaliation charge). The NM Ct. App. summarily upheld P’s conviction on P’s sufficiency of the evidence challenge.
The 10th first noted that the issue of sufficient evidence is primarily legal and the AEDPA standard of deference forbids the federal court from granting relief unless the state appellate court’s adjudication “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” HOWEVER, in this case, and for you habe-o-philes out there, this is part of where Chuck’s and Susan’s victory lies: if the federal court must consider any additional material facts from the trial transcript that were not placed before the state appellate court, then the federal court “should not defer” to the state court decision. Because the NM Ct. App. only did a summary calendar review and did not review the entire trial transcript in this case, the feds were not required to (and would not be allowed to) defer to the state decision.
HOWEVER, this opinion is authored by Hartz. He did not criticize the NM state calendaring system AND he decided that the trial transcript did not add anything to the P’s state court docketing statement SO the 10th could and did give deference to the state court decision after all.
Still with me?
Even under AEDPA deference, however, the evidence was insufficient. The 10th squeezed the facts to find evidence of a link between P’s writing of the threatening letter and his knowledge that V reported a felony arson and could not find it. Hence, victory!
10th Cir. Unpublished Cases
Boles v. Dansdill, 2006 WL 2615522 (10th Cir. Sept. 13, 2006)
In pro se prison conditions case, 10th acknowledges P did all he could to exhaust his administrative remedies (against the tide of a slow moving, unresponsive and even obstructionist administration) and reverses the district court’s dismissal of his suit.
U.S. v. Wilson, 2006 WL 2615509 (10th Cir. Sept. 13, 2006)
Although indictment erroneously did not charge the amount of drugs that would have exposed D to a sentence up to the 30 year statutory maximum, because he “admitted” that he had 10 grams of crack cocaine, he laid a factual basis for the court to sentence him to 30 years and any error was harmless. (Problem is the admission, by D’s attorney, was more in the way of distinguishing the count he was pleading guilty to from the cou
Mr. Torres gets relief on his habeas petition.
Issue: was there sufficient evidence at the state trial to prove that P's threatening letter to V was in retaliation for V's giving information to authorities that P committed a felony arson? Answer: No.
P had been allegedly involved in two arsons in relation to V: an earlier felony arson, and a later misdemeanor arson. P was tried on the misdemeanor arson and after the misdemeanor trial, P wrote the threatening letter. At P’s subsequent trial for retaliation against a witness (the subject of this habeas case), the state presented no evidence that P had any knowledge that V had reported the earlier felony arson to authorities (reporting a felony was an element of the retaliation charge). The NM Ct. App. summarily upheld P’s conviction on P’s sufficiency of the evidence challenge.
The 10th first noted that the issue of sufficient evidence is primarily legal and the AEDPA standard of deference forbids the federal court from granting relief unless the state appellate court’s adjudication “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” HOWEVER, in this case, and for you habe-o-philes out there, this is part of where Chuck’s and Susan’s victory lies: if the federal court must consider any additional material facts from the trial transcript that were not placed before the state appellate court, then the federal court “should not defer” to the state court decision. Because the NM Ct. App. only did a summary calendar review and did not review the entire trial transcript in this case, the feds were not required to (and would not be allowed to) defer to the state decision.
HOWEVER, this opinion is authored by Hartz. He did not criticize the NM state calendaring system AND he decided that the trial transcript did not add anything to the P’s state court docketing statement SO the 10th could and did give deference to the state court decision after all.
Still with me?
Even under AEDPA deference, however, the evidence was insufficient. The 10th squeezed the facts to find evidence of a link between P’s writing of the threatening letter and his knowledge that V reported a felony arson and could not find it. Hence, victory!
10th Cir. Unpublished Cases
Boles v. Dansdill, 2006 WL 2615522 (10th Cir. Sept. 13, 2006)
In pro se prison conditions case, 10th acknowledges P did all he could to exhaust his administrative remedies (against the tide of a slow moving, unresponsive and even obstructionist administration) and reverses the district court’s dismissal of his suit.
U.S. v. Wilson, 2006 WL 2615509 (10th Cir. Sept. 13, 2006)
Although indictment erroneously did not charge the amount of drugs that would have exposed D to a sentence up to the 30 year statutory maximum, because he “admitted” that he had 10 grams of crack cocaine, he laid a factual basis for the court to sentence him to 30 years and any error was harmless. (Problem is the admission, by D’s attorney, was more in the way of distinguishing the count he was pleading guilty to from the cou
posted by Anonymous at 10:06 AM
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