BP Stop on Ranch Road Supported by Reasonable Suspicion; Pre-Miranda Statements Not Suppressed
U.S. v. Carrizales-Toledo, 2006 WL 2022911 (7/20/06) - The 10th holds that a traffic stop near the border was supported by reasonable suspicion and the defendant's post-Miranda statements were admissible, even assuming pre-Miranda statements were inadmissible. Reasonable suspicion was established because: the border patrol agent had encountered smuggling in the area of the stop (near Hachita, N.M.) and his colleagues had intercepted a marijuana load there the week before; the rancher in the area told the agent no one would be working on the ranch that day; the agent saw defendant's pickup 12 to 15 miles from the border; the agent did not recognize the truck or the driver as being from the area; when the agent pulled to the side of the one-lane road to allow the defendant to pass, the defendant acted as anyone would who confronts the border patrol while carrying a load of marijuana, he stopped and started driving backward toward the border; after the agent started following the truck, the truck stopped. The 10th found that, while it was not impossible that the defendant was backing up to a wide point in the road to allow the agent to pass, the agent did not have to rule out all innocent explanations and could reasonably view the defendant's actions as suspicious.
The statements flowed very soon after the stop. When the agent stopped the truck, he noticed the defendant had his hands in the air. As the agent approached the truck, he saw piles of bundles wrapped like marijuana on the front seat and floorboard. Without giving Miranda warnings, the agent asked the defendant what he was doing. The crafty defendant cooly responded: "I was trying to get back to Mexico so you wouldn't catch me with all this stuff." The agent guilelessly queried: "With what stuff?" ["Gambling in this establishment??? I'm shocked!!!"] "The marijuana," the defendant helpfully replied. Thinking he might be able to make a case, the agent arrested the defendant. The defendant was later interrogated by the arresting agent and two or three others. The defendant then went into more detail about his trip. The 10th declined to address whether the pre-Miranda questions fell under the "public safety" exception (the d.ct.'s rationale) or the defendant was not yet in custody (the government's argument). Instead, the 10th found that the post-Miranda statements cured any inadmissibility of the pre-Miranda statements. Without reaching a conclusion, the 10th explored what test should be applied under Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004), the case where the police deliberately did not initially give Miranda warnings in order to get statements after finally giving Miranda warnings. Four justices in that case applied an objective test and held that the second statements were inadmissible because the warnings could not reasonably function effectively under the circumstances. Justice Kennedy held that those statements were inadmissible because they were obtained as part of a subjectively deliberate plan. The 10th noted that the usual rule in a situation where no majority principle carried the day would be to apply the narrowest ground for the ultimate decision. The 10th opined, however, that that rule does not necessarily apply where, as in Seibert, one rationale is not a logical subset of the other. The quandary did not have to be resolved because the defendant lost under either Seibert principle, the 10th held. Under the plurality rule, the warning was effective in this case because: the initial questions were brief and spontaneous; the second statements were more detailed than the first statements; the second interrogation was held in a different setting at a different time and with even more officers (?) than the first; and, "perhaps most importantly," there was no evidence the second round interrogators referred to the first statements. Under Justice Kennedy's rationale, there was no evidence the officers engaged in a deliberate plan to undermine the defendant's Miranda rights and the initial statements were voluntary.
The statements flowed very soon after the stop. When the agent stopped the truck, he noticed the defendant had his hands in the air. As the agent approached the truck, he saw piles of bundles wrapped like marijuana on the front seat and floorboard. Without giving Miranda warnings, the agent asked the defendant what he was doing. The crafty defendant cooly responded: "I was trying to get back to Mexico so you wouldn't catch me with all this stuff." The agent guilelessly queried: "With what stuff?" ["Gambling in this establishment??? I'm shocked!!!"] "The marijuana," the defendant helpfully replied. Thinking he might be able to make a case, the agent arrested the defendant. The defendant was later interrogated by the arresting agent and two or three others. The defendant then went into more detail about his trip. The 10th declined to address whether the pre-Miranda questions fell under the "public safety" exception (the d.ct.'s rationale) or the defendant was not yet in custody (the government's argument). Instead, the 10th found that the post-Miranda statements cured any inadmissibility of the pre-Miranda statements. Without reaching a conclusion, the 10th explored what test should be applied under Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004), the case where the police deliberately did not initially give Miranda warnings in order to get statements after finally giving Miranda warnings. Four justices in that case applied an objective test and held that the second statements were inadmissible because the warnings could not reasonably function effectively under the circumstances. Justice Kennedy held that those statements were inadmissible because they were obtained as part of a subjectively deliberate plan. The 10th noted that the usual rule in a situation where no majority principle carried the day would be to apply the narrowest ground for the ultimate decision. The 10th opined, however, that that rule does not necessarily apply where, as in Seibert, one rationale is not a logical subset of the other. The quandary did not have to be resolved because the defendant lost under either Seibert principle, the 10th held. Under the plurality rule, the warning was effective in this case because: the initial questions were brief and spontaneous; the second statements were more detailed than the first statements; the second interrogation was held in a different setting at a different time and with even more officers (?) than the first; and, "perhaps most importantly," there was no evidence the second round interrogators referred to the first statements. Under Justice Kennedy's rationale, there was no evidence the officers engaged in a deliberate plan to undermine the defendant's Miranda rights and the initial statements were voluntary.
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